Musical Expression and First Amendment Considerations by Fifer, Samuel
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 24 
Issue 1 Fall 1974 Article 6 
Musical Expression and First Amendment Considerations 
Samuel Fifer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Samuel Fifer, Musical Expression and First Amendment Considerations, 24 DePaul L. Rev. 143 (1974) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol24/iss1/6 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
MUSICAL EXPRESSION AND FIRST
AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission's series of encounters with
the problem of drug-oriented lyrics in popular music have produced three
official Commission edicts, one court of appeals decision, a denial of
certiorari, a certain amount of licensee jitteriness, and considerable con-
fusion. The drama began on March 5, 1971, when the FCC issued a Pub-
lic Notice entitled Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their
Broadcast.1 This Notice was initially directed at requiring licensees to
ascertain the contents of their programmed records and to be aware that
lyrics that tended to glorify drug usage were not highly favored. 2  The
Commission, sensing that it had confused the issue somewhat, moved to
clarify matters by issuing a Memorandum Opinion and Order.3 In that
Order the Commission cautioned licensees against interpreting the initial
Notice as a ban on particular songs, but reiterated two items of import-
ance: that the licensee is ultimately responsible for material that it broad-
casts and that a broadcaster might jeopardize its license by failing to exer-
cise licensee responsibility.4
In August, 1971, several irate parties sought still further clarifica-
tion of the initial Public Notice, especially the various terms employed
such as "licensee responsibility," "promote or glorify," etc. The August
Memorandum Opinion and Order5 dealt with these requests in relatively
short order. The Commission thought the matter required no further
comment, and also refused to consider the merits of a statement of station
1. 28 F.C.C.2d 409, 21 P & F RADio Ran. 2d 1576 (1971). See Comment,
Drug Songs and the Federal Communications Commission, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
334 (1972).
2. This theme, and corollary issue is more fully developed later in this com-
ment. Suffice it to say at this point, however, that the effect the notice had upon
the broadcast industry was considerable. Compare BROADCASTINO, Mar. 8, 1971,
at 10 (a meekly worded news report) with Coast to Coast Flap Over Drug Lyrics,
BROADCAST NO, Mar. 22, 1971, at 73 (a full-blown news story, complete with com-
mentary). Reaction time: 14 days.
3. 31 F.C.C.2d 377, 21 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1698 (1971).
4. id. at 379, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 1702.
5. 31 F.C.C.2d 385, 22 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1808 (1971).
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policy proffered by The Yale Broadcasting Company.6 The Court of Ap-
peals -for the District of Columbia saw no difficulty with any of the orders7
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.8 And so the matter would seem
to rest, except for two unresolved related issues that call for further in-
quiry. First, the Notices raise the threshold question of whether lyrics and
music are protected speech. Second, as observed by Commissioner Nich-
olas Johnson, the Commission's attempt to curtail the air play of certain
items-some occasionally charged with political content 9 -could chill cer-
tain protected expression. 10 This Comment will review and analyze the
administrative and judicial history of the Notices and suggest that lyrics
and music be accorded protection under the first amendment.
THE NOTICES
The problem was initially presented by the Commission as a reflection
of complaints it had received.
A number of complaints received by the Commission concerning the lyrics
of records played on broadcasting stations relate to a subject of current
and pressing concern: the use of language tending to promote or glorify
the use of illegal drugs such as marijuana, LSD, "speed", etc."
The context in which this First Notice was issued, and the backdrop
which gives meaning to the Commission's repeated conceptions of what
the broadcaster's programming duties are, was one of general licensee
responsibility. The 1960 Network Programming Inquiry12 established the
basic duty:
Broadcasting licensees must assume responsibility for all material which is
6. This item proved to be less troublesome to the FCC than the parties who
proferred it-Yale Broadasting Company. They pursued the matter through the
court of appeals and as far through the Supreme Court as seven justices would al-
low. See discussion in text accompanying note 39 infra.
7. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
8. 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
9. See First Notice, 28 F.C.C.2d 409, 414-15, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1576,
1583 (1971).
10. The fact that these fears were ignored is not altogether surprising, owing
to Commissioner Johnson's low level of credibility with his fellow commissioners.
11. First Notice, 28 F.C.C.2d 409, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1576 (1971). It
is interesting to note that after the dust settled, the industry had reacted so com-
pletely that at least one commentator was moved to observe, perhaps incorrectly,
that the issue had seemed to have died down. Rather, the success of the Notice,
if translated into widespread compliance, created an issue of crucial importance.
The drug-lyrics issue seems to have abated. The Commission has received few
complaints about such material in recent months, and the commission has never
moved against a broadcaster as a result of his airing drug-related lyrics. Supreme
Court Backs FCC on Drug Lyrics, BROADCASnNo, Oct. 22, 1973, at 41.
12. 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960).
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broadcast through their facilities. This includes all programs and advertis-
ing material which they present to the public. . . . This duty is personal
to the licensee and may not be delegated. He is obligated to bring his
positive responsibility affirmatively to bear upon all who have a hand in
providing broadcast matter for transmission through his facilities so as to
assure the discharge of his duty to provide acceptable program schedule
consonant with operating in the public interest in his community.'8
It was in this context that the First Notice appeared, at least that was
the way in which Commissioner H. Rex Lee perceived it. 14  However,
it is somewhat inaccurate to say that the 1971 Notice merely rearticu-
lated the 1960 policy statement. The 1960 statement dealt with a broad
topic, the advisability of suggesting qualitative programming standards
and the problem of ascertaining audience needs in terms of the public
interest standard. The single paragraph reference to local responsibility
for programming was directed at issues quite different from those en-
countered in the drug-lyric context. Rather, these remarks were intended
to remind licensees that their operation in the public interest must neces-
sarily take into account some assessment of local needs and interests. 15
The intent of this statement was clearly connected to the overall context
of the 1960 Statement-i.e.,-ascertainment of local needs-and nothing
more. 16 Such statements of administrative policy may well have inter-
stices, but none that courts should feel compelled to fill.1 7
The First Notice alerted licensees to three specific programming dut-
ies in relation to drug-oriented lyrics: (1) that licensees should make
"reasonable efforts" to determine the meaning of music containing drug-
13. Id. at 7295. The elusive "public interest convenience and necessity" is a
magic phrase that crops up regularly throughout the Communications Act. 47
U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. (1970). No license or permit is granted or renewed without
the Commission's satisfaction that the grant or renewal will serve this standard.
14. Indeed, characterizing the First Notice as nothing more than a reminder-
a refinement and articulation of pre-existing duties-would have eliminated certain
difficulties. First Notice, 28 F.C.C.2d at 410, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 1577.
The court of appeals concurred in this characterization. Yale Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
15. The quoted excerpt from the 1960 Policy Statement does not tell the whole
story. It continues:
mhe broadcaster is obligated to make a positive, diligent and continuing ef-
fort in good faith, to determine the tastes, needs and desires of the public in
his community and to provide programming to meet those needs and inter-
ests. This again, is a duty personal to the licensee and may not be
avoided by delegation of the responsibility to others.
Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960).
16. Cf. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
17. Statutes invariably have gaps in meaning that courts are compelled to fill.
See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION LAW 121-30 (tent. ed. 1958).
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oriented lyrics before broadcasting them;' 8 (2) that this knowledge
must be in the hands of some management executive of the licensee;
(3) and that this same executive-or in any event, some responsible offi-
cial-should then make the decision as to whether or not the particular
selection should be played.
Why was this initial Notice issued? The first paragraph of the Notice
provides some guidance in its reference to the Commission's receipt of
"[a] number of complaints . . ." about drug-oriented music.19 The fact
that the Defense Department had made available to the Commission a list
of twenty-two songs that it thought suspect may have had something to
do with the Commission's actionY In any event, and whatever the mo-
tivating force behind the Notice, it was interpreted as a no-nonsense edict:
stop drug-lyrics. 21 Commissioner Robert E. Lee left no room for doubt:
I sincerely hope that the action of the Commission today in releasing a
"Public Notice" with respect to Licensee Responsibility to Review Records
Before Their Broadcast will discourage, if not eliminate the playing of rec-
cords which tend to promote and/or glorify the use of illegal drugs.
Obviously, if such records promote the use of illegal drugs, the licensee
will exercise appropriate judgment in determining whether the broadcasting
of such records is in the public interest.22
And Commissioner Johnson, in dissent, sounded his own alarm:
Under the guise of assuring that licensees know what lyrics are being aired
on their stations, the FCC today gives a loud and clear message: get those
18. It is curious to note that the Commission considered song lyrics to be as
readily decipherable as foreign language programming. First Notice, 28 F.C.C.2d
409 n.1, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1576 n.1 (1971).
19. 28 F.C.C.2d409, 21 P&FRADIO REG. 2d 1576 (1971).
20. See New York Times, Mar. 28, 1971, at 41, col. 1; Ups and Downs of Drug
Lyrics, BROADCASTING, Apr. 19, 1971, at 28. The list is an intriguing one, con-
taining songs with frank drug-oriented overtones, songs with strong anti-drug mes-
sages, songs of total innocence and at least one song that was included for no ap-
parent reason other than the fact that its title happens to contain, in well-shrouded
form, the acronym for a well-known hallucinogen. The list: "I Get By With A
Little Help From My Friends," "Cocaine Blues," "White Rabbit," "Acid Queen,"
"The Virgin Fugs," "The New Amphetamine Shriek," "The Alphabet Song," "I
Like Marijuana," "Hashing," "Walking in Space," "Heroin," "Fire Poem," "Don't
Step on the Grass," "Velvet Cave," "Cloud Nine," "The Pusher," "Tambourine
Man," "Puff the Magic Dragon," "Eight Miles High," "Acapulco Gold," "Along
Comes Mary," "Happiness is a Warm Gun," "Mellow Yellow," "Lucy in the
Sky With Diamonds." It is also interesting to note that Commissioner John-
son thought that the Commission's concern with drug-lyrics was unnecessarily con-
fining-that the Notice might also have dealt with other drug problems-alcohol
abuses and over the counter drugs. See 28 F.C.C.2d at 412, 21 P & F RADIO REG.
2d at 1580-82.
21. The industry's reaction was typically jittery, and is discussed at p. 147 infra.
22. 28 F.C.C.2d at 410, 21 P & F RADIO REo. 2d at 1577.
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"drug lyrics" off the air (and no telling what other subject matter the
Commission majority may find offensive), or you may have trouble at li-
cense renewal time. 23
The ambiguous First Notice sent the industry into a small panic. To
have said that the Notice did not effect a ban on certain music may have
been true but in light of the Damoclean sword of license renewal, extreme
reactions were no surprise. If some licensees were confused they did not
let on, but simply swung the ax, as appropriate. 24  Many in broadcasting
rebelled at the very thought of curtailing air-play of certain songs, think-
ing it an inappropriate method for dealing with an acknowledged prob-
lem. 25 Finally, the only consensus was confusion:
The consensus among progressive rock stations . . . was that the Commis-
sion's Notice is vague as to what it wants of its licensees, and does not
offer specific guidelines and strictures.2 6
Anxious to end the confusion, the Commission issued a Second No-
tice,27 which it styled as its "definitive statement in this respect. ' 28  The
Commission made three general observations that it hoped would have
a settling effect: (1) that the First Notice should not have been con-
strued to be a direct prohibition of any particular type of record, but
rather that the Commission's only direct imposition of will would occur
in the renewal context;29 (2) that there would be no active reprisals;
23. 28 F.C.C.2d at 412, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 1579.
24. Some licensees initiated flat bans on certain songs, some on all "drug-men-
tioning" songs. There is no hint as to the criteria used in these decisions. At
least one announcer was fired.
An early-perhaps the first-combat over the FCC move came March 11
in Philadelphia. Max Leon, owner of WDAS-FM consented to the firing of
his son Steve Leon as the station's program director and air personality.
Steve was fired, said Max, because he "revolted to the censorship of
songs." Both Steve and Max Leon believe the FCC notice is unconstitu-
tional.
Coast-to-Coast Flap Over Drug Lyrics, BROADCASTING, Mar. 22, 1971, at 73. In
fairness, many licensees proceeded as though nothing had changed.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Review of Records on Drugs, 31 F.C.C.2d 377, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d
1698 (1971).
28. Id. at 378, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 1700.
29. Here is another instance of the Commission rattling the sword of Damocles.
The chilling effect of such statements is undeniable and irreversible.
No matter how urgently we are subsequently assured that all is forgiven
and that we are encouraged to "speak our minds" . . . we have already
been psychologically inhibited. The First Amendment damage has already
been done.
Broadcasters-courageous and cowardly alike-are a pretty skittish lot.
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and (3) that there nevertheless did exist an affirmative responsibility on
the part of licensees to (a) know a record's contents, (b) judge the rec-
ord's suitability for broadcast, and (c) be prepared to sink or swim by
these decisions at renewal time. With these reassurances, the Com-
mission next moved to suggest specific behaviors. It suggested that no
pre-screening would be required, but that a licensee might discharge its
duty to give "reasonable and good faith attention to the problem" 30 by
(1) pre-screening selections, (2) monitoring selections as they are played,
and (3) responding to public complaints regarding certain selections.
And so, it seemed, the confusion came to an end. Commissioner H.
Rex Lee thought the matter well disposed of, and construed the "action
to mean the Commission is merely reaffirming its 1960 Program Policy
Statement covering the general area of licensee responsibility."' 31 In this
Second Notice, the familiar hobgoblin of "clear and present danger"
made an appearance.3 2  The context in which it appeared, curiously,
was one of reassurance-stating that no attempt to review or condemn
the judgment of any licensee could legally occur unless a particular item
of programming content constituted a "clear and present danger."'33 The
reference was unelaborated, with the Commission making no indication
as to what would and would not pass the clear and present danger test.
The lack of elaboration was especially ironic in a notice issued to clarify
matters.
Yet a third-and in many ways the most important--Commission ac-
The Administration and the FCC know that. Having been told-very
loudly and clearly-that powerful people in Washington are interested in
their records' song lyrics, all too many will go out of their way to select
lyrics designed to please. At that point the Government has succeeded in
its purpose; it is then safe to issue all the apologies and rescinding state-
ments necessary to silence the critics.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 31 F.C.C.2d 385, 387-88 (1971). (Commis-
sioner Johnson, dissenting). It should be noted that refusals to renew are generally
rare and reserved for only the most brutally extreme licensee shortcomings. See,
e.g., Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962) af'd sub nom., Robinson
v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
30. 31 F.C.C.2d at 380, 21 P & F RA.no REo. 2d at 1703.
31. Id. at 382, 21P & F RtAio REG. 2d at 1705.
32. The "clear and present danger" test has a noble heritage. See, e.g.,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Froh-
werk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
33. See In re Complaint of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith Against
Station KTYM, Inglewood, Calif., 4 F.C.C.2d 190, 191 (1966).
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tion took place on August 4, 1971. Several parties8 4 petitioned for recon-
sideration of the Second Notice-the clarification. Not surprisingly, espe-
cially since the Commission had styled its Second Notice as its "definitive
statement"--the Commission refused to modify any of the observations
made in the Second Notice. The Commission took to scolding the peti-
tioners, pointing out that all it had wanted to do was to enunciate the fa-
miliar concept of licensee responsibility. 35  Seeing all of the issues pre-
sented to it as obvious and capable of easy understanding and application,
the Commission demurred.36 Swept along, though, was an added compli-
cation-the statement of Programming Policy issued by the Yale Broad-
casting Company and submitted to the Commission for its consideration.
The Commission refused to consider it for reasons of administrative econ-
omy and because it saw a certain danger in making any definitive state-
ments on issues that had not yet been fully developed.3 7 The Yale state-
ment presented a series of observations, most of which, however, seemed
to be very pointed in nature and not at all general. Of eleven paragraphs,
only two dealt with specific licensee behaviors-selective monitoring of
records, and announcer instruction to notify management of tradition-
ally offensive material in records, i.e., obscenity, lotteries, etc.38
YALE BROADCASTING COMPANY V. FCC
The scene next shifted to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, where the parties to the Third Notice mounted a substantive
attack on the first two Notices.39 The petitioners voiced three major
objections: (1) that the Commission's action imposed an unconstitu-
tional burden on a broadcaster's freedom of speech; (2) that the notices
imposed new duties upon broadcasters without the benefit of a rule-
34. Yale Broadcasting Company, University of the Pacific, Steve Leon, Na-
tional Co-Ordinating Council on Drug Abuse Education and Information, Inc.,
Mark Gorbulew, Sara Vass, John Gorman, Kermeth P. Currier, Stuart Jackson,
James H. Irwin, and Charles Laquidara.
35. In re Licensee Responsibility To Review Records Before Their Broadcast,
31 F.C.C.2d 385, 22 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1808 (1971).
36. In so doing, the Commission noted that there was no pre-screening re-
quirement. Id. at 386 n.1, 22 P & F RADI REQ. 2d at 1809 n.l.
37. "We are loath to embark upon individual rulings for individual licensees
concerning their proposed handling of specific types of programming upon the
basis of general policy statements not fleshed out by the licensee's actual opera-
tion." Id. at 386, 22 P & F RADio REG. 2d at 1809.
38. The Policy Statement is appended to Commissioner Johnson's dissent.
d. at 388, 22 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 1811.
39. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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making proceeding; 40 and (3) that the notices involved vague language
and that the FCC abused its discretion by refusing clarification.
The Burdens
The petitioners claimed that pre-screening imposed a great burden
upon licensees. The petitioners claimed this burden was unconstitu-
tional in light of Smith v. California41 and the court rejected their con-
tention noting that Smith involved circumstances and burdens easily dis-
tinguishable from those attendant to broadcast licensees.4 2  The court
pointed out that a broadcast licensee's pre-screening burden could in no
way be compared to a bookseller's burden of inspecting each of many
thousand volumes on his shelves and that, as the Commission indicated,
pre-screening was not the only way to acquire the requisite knowledge.
The court's short disposition of the burden analogy does not adequately
dispose of the petitioners' claim. The court's rejection of the analogy
ignores the qualitative onerousness of the requirement above and beyond
the comparison of the relative physical burdens.
There was, through all, a reaffirmation of the licensee's duty to know
what it broadcasts. The Commission's requirements, the court said, were
just one way of ensuring that licensees have this knowledge. 43
No New Duties
The court chose to accept the Commission's characterization of the
Notices as merely rearticulating pre-existing duties. Had the Commis-
40. The industry's conception of these duties was that licensees were required
to do the following: (1) Listen to each record; (2) decipher its lyrics; (3) un-
derstand its lyrics; (4) decide if a particular song pertains to drug usage; (5) de-
termine if playing the song will serve the public interest. FCC Holds Fast: Sta-
tions Must Rule on Drug Lyrics, BROADCASTINO, Oct. 30, 1972, at 39.
41. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
42. The case involved a Los Angeles obscenity ordinance making it illegal to
possess obscene matter in a bookstore. Liability was imposed without any require-
ment of knowledge by the bookseller of the contents of the materials. The con-
viction of the bookseller under the ordinance was overturned on the ground that
holding him strictly liable for knowing the contents of his wares, and the comple-
mentary requirement that he ascertain the contents of what he sells, would chill
the distribution of protected as well as unprotected works.
43. The "food" cases make interesting reading, but poor analogies. See, e.g.,
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). In this discussion, the Court in
Smith briefly brought up the notion of self-censorship, but decided it would be in-
appropriate: "the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the
press stand in the way of imposing a similar requirement on the bookseller."
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959). Self-censorship can have dam-
aging effects on broadcasting as well.
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sion imposed new duties on licensees through the Notices, its action
would have been subjected to the debate and scrutiny of a rulemaking
proceeding. Though the court never said so in so many words, it must
necessarily have characterized -the Commission's action as pursuant to a
"general statement of policy," and therefore exempt from rulemaking pro-
cedures under the Administrative Procedure Act. 44 The distinction be-
tween such exempt statements of policy and rulemaking is generally clear,
but where, as in this case, the industry to whom the statement is meant
to apply so consistently construed the Commission's statement as though
they were strict prescriptions of required activity, within the meaning of
the APA, perhaps the Commission had achieved all of the benefits of rule-
making with none of the burdens. 5 Since, as Commissioner Johnson rec-
ognized, broadcasters as a group are quick to fall into line at the first sign
of even a lifted eyebrow, and since the Commission must have been aware
of the industry's skittishness, the Notices could have been considered ipso
facto rulemaking. The only difficulty with this construction is the obvious
one-any time the Commission so much as says "boo," a rulemaking pro-
ceeding would have to be initiated. The relative benefits and burdens of
such an approach are, at best, unclear. 46
The court went on to point to the 1960 Network Programming
Inquiry as indicative of the general overall standard of licensee respon-
sibility,47 and to say that periodic prods to deficient licensees are proper.
How Vague Is Vague?
The petitioners complained that the Commission's Order was uncon-
stitutionally vague, and that, given this defect, the Commission abused its
discretion by failing to clarify it. The court characterized this two-
pronged argument as the weakest of all the petitioners' arguments. While
reality may have had no bearing upon the grace of petitioners' argu-
ments, the fact was that the industry-that group ito which the Notices
were to have had meaning-was confused as to what was being re-
quired of it.4 8 While broadcasters may be a nervous lot, they are prob-
ably also individuals of common intelligence, capable of understanding
any set of behavioral guidelines.49 Therefore, the effect the Notices had
44. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1970).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
46. See 478 F.2d at 601 n.22. See also Note, The Judicial Role in Defining
Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 782, 787-90
(1974).
47. See discussion at note 13 supra.
48. See note 26 supra.
49. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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upon the industry should indicate that the Commission had failed-not-
withstanding its attempts at clarification-to make its intentions clearly
known.
The court was not moved. Conceding that the void-for-vagueness
doctrine applied "with full force to the broadcast industry,"50 the court
professed admiration for the Commission's efforts in explaining the "na-
ture 'and degree of knowledge expected of broadcasters . . . . [T]he
court ha[d] no difficulty understanding what the Commission expect[ed]
of its licensees." 51 This admiration, unexpected as it may have been, was
understandable once the conceptual roots for the court's conclusion had
been adequately unearthed. If, as the court accepted it, the 1960 Policy
Statement could be construed to serve as a basis for the Notices, the
logical justification became the same as that used by the Commission.
From that point-(and at the same time ignoring the quasi-rulemaking
features of the Notices and the extreme reaction of the industry)-the
process of understanding what the Commission meant in its carefully
chosen words might have been easy enough-had it occurred in a vac-
uum. Understanding the words said may have been (and may be) one
thing, but assessing the effects of these words upon the industry is quite
another.52
The second prong of petitioners' vagueness claim cited the Commis-
sion for abusing its discretion in failing to make some declaration on the
propriety of Yale Broadcasting's statement. Here the court stood on more
solid ground. The Yale Broadcasting statement had little in it worthy of
comment.58 What might have been worthy of comment was what re-
mained unsaid-that Yale Broadcasting had no intention of toeing the
drug-lyric line. It would have been difficult, without a more concrete set
of facts, to make a definitive declaration as to the state of Yale Broadcast-
ing's compliance.
A Dissent
Chief Judge Bazelon's statement in favor of granting a rehearing en
50. "Conceding" is the wrong word-"assuming" is more appropriate. Strange
that it should have been so phrased for two reasons: (1) does it require a con-
cession or even an assumption of any kind to apply the doctrine to a federal
scheme; (2) is it proper to style the doctrine as applicable to the broadcast in-
dustry, as opposed to the broadcast regulators. See generally Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
51. 478 F.2d at 601.
52. The court's specific understanding was threefold-that the Notices (i.e.
the Order) clearly defined their intention, provided examples of behavior that
would comply, but did not limit manner of compliance to the cited examples. 478
F.2d at 601.
53. But cf. Par. (1) and (j), 31 F.C.C.2d at 389-90.
[Vol. 24:143
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banc sua spoute54 developed a series of interrelated observations. It is
given that the courts-and especially the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia in relation to broadcast regulation and the "public interest"
standard-have a great responsibility to protect first amendment inter-
ests. The proper discharge of that responsibility, Bazelon argued, should
have included an effort by the court to assess "the impact of these di-
rectives, not merely their language."55  Such an assessment, he contin-
ued, would have been all the more appropriate in light of the public in-
terest standard, and in a situation that presented self-censorship prob-
lems. 56
In many ways, a regulation that calls for or results in self-censor-
ship, while appearing to be relatively less harmful than officially im-
posed sanctions that contain specific proscriptions, is possible more in-
sidious since it can accomplish its purpose indirectly:
A regulation of communication may run afoul of the constitution not be-
cause it is aimed directly at the speech but because in operation it may
trigger a set of behavioral consequences which amount in effect to people
censoring themselves in order to avoid trouble with the law. The idea has
appeared in several cases, and, while the court has not yet addressed a ma-
jor opinion to it, it has all the earmarks of a seminal concept.5 7
The harm that self-censorship inflicts upon speech of any kind, but
most especially broadcasting, is the introduction of timidity. By seeking
out the inoffensive, the neutral, or the non-controversial, a broadcaster
54. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).
55. 478 F.2d at 605.
56. See In re Complaint of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith Against
Station KTYM, Inglewood, Calif., 6 F.C.C.2d 385, 398 (1967) (Commissioner
Loevinger, concurring).
Talk of "responsibility" of a broadcaster in this connection is simply a
euphemism for self-censorship. It is an attempt to shift the onus of action
against speech from the Commission to the broadcaster, but it seeks the
same result-suppression of certain views and arguments. Since the im-
position of the duty of such "responsibility" involves Commission compul-
sion to perform the function of selection and exclusion and Commission
supervision of the manner in which that function is performed, the Com-
mission still retains the ultimate power to determine what is and what is
not permitted on the air (emphasis added).
57. Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-Open"-A Note on Free Speech and
the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 289, 297 (1968). The cases Professor Kal-
yen referred to are: Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1962); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 (1959) (discussed in text accompanying note 43 supra), and
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), all three of which were, incidentally,
authored by Justice Brennan.
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may be assured of the security of his license, but may, at the same time,
deny to the public material that may have lasting importance.58
Judge Bazelon's two concluding queries present important issues
which will be more fully developed later in this comment: do songs de-
serve first amendment protection and is there a demonstrable connection
between drug-oriented lyrics and illegal activities?59
TOWARDS PROTECTION OF Music
Far from being a tempest in an administrative teapot, the Notices
present important issues-among them a first amendment threat that is
difficult to ignore. The temptation to nod sleepily at yet another ex-
ample of childish Commission activity-to watch amusedly at an attempt
to tie another rag to the kite called "the public interest convenience and
58. As an example, the Supreme Court has recognized that a broadcaster is not
compelled to accept paid editorial advertisements. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The Supreme
Court's affirmance of the broadcasters' right to refuse, while perhaps fair in an ul-
timate sense, ignores the trustee role that the broadcaster occupies. See, e.g., Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). If all broadcast outlets re-
fuse to enter the fray, how is this denial of a voice to be characterized? It no
doubt matters little to the purveyor of the editorial message that licensees fear fair-
ness repercussions and thus refuse to sell time to those with a highly charged
political message. The result though, is clear: timidity, with Court blessing may
prevent a message from being heard even without any assessment of possible harms.
See also Hutchinson & Clark, Sell-Censorship in Broadcasting-The Cowardly
Lions, 18 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1972); Comment, Right of Access to Broadcasting: The
Supreme Court Takes a Dim View, 62 GEO. L.J. 355 (1973). For discussion of
self-censorship in the film industry see Ayer, Bate & Herman, Self-Censorship in
the Movie-Industry: An Historical Perspective on Law and Social Change, 1970
WIs. L. REV. 791.
Viewers of American television may recall a recent example of the effects of
timidity. The American Broadcasting Company chose not to run a Dick Cavett
Show, fearing that the scheduled guests-members of the Chicago Seven-would
represent their point of view one-sidedly. The network, perhaps incorrectly ap-
plying what the fairness doctrine demands--i.e.--overall balance-suggested that
individuals espousing contrary opinions be included in the program. See Chicago
Sun-Times, Feb. 8, 1974, at 38, col. 1. This overreaction was so extreme that
it may be unfair to say that it was specifically mandated by case law or Commis-
sion policy.
59. One last gasp was issued by Justice Douglas in his dissent to the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari. He touched on the problem of adverse psychological
impact caused by the initial orders, specifically citing Commissioner Dean Burch's
attitude toward a non-complying licensee: "I know what I would do, I would
probably vote to take the license away." 414 U.S. 914 (1973), citing Hearings on
the Effect of the Promotion and Advertising of Over-the-Counter Drugs on Com-
petition, Small Business, and Health and Welfare of the Public, before the Sub-
comm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cons., lt
Sess. pt. 2, at 734-36 (1971).
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necessity"-must be overcome. The context in which this threat should
be analyzed is a familiar one-government regulation of broadcast
speech; specifically, regulation of program content.
Program Content
The traditional reach of program content regulation60 has extended
to control of obscenity, 6' lotteries, 62 broadcast of gambling informa-
tion,63 fraudulent contests, 64 and fraudulent gift shows. 65
The context in which the Commission exercises its control, such as it
is, can vary. Most likely, it will show up in a renewal proceeding66 but
could just as easily-much to the horror of an offending licensee-show
up in a revocation proceeding, 7 in a request for a cease and desist or-
der,68 in a suspension proceeding,69 or pursuant to a forfeiture assess-
ment. 70  The Commission's concern is that licensees present broad pro-
gramming in the public interest, 71 but at the same time, the Commission
60. See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARv. L. REV.
701 (1964).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970). See also In re WUHY-FM, Eastern Education
Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 860 (1970).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970).
64. KWK, Inc., 34 F.C.C. 1039, affd, KWK Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 337 F.2d 540
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 910 (1964). This case is especially rele-
vant due to one of its inherent issues-that the fact that program material is pre-
sented without prior station-manager approval will not absolve the licensee of re-
sponsibility.
65. 47 U.S.C. § 509 (1970). See Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media:
A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARv. L. REv. 664
(1971). See also Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
66. See generally Mallamud, The Broadcast Licensee as Fiduciary: Toward
the Enforcement of Discretion, 1973 DuKE L.J. 89. See also Palmetto Broadcast-
ing Co., 33 F.C.C. 250, 23 P & F RADIO REG. 483 (1962), a!f'd sub nom, Robin-
son v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1970). These actions are relatively rare.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1970).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(d) (1970).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970). A recent application of the forfeiture took
place in In the Matter of Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d
777, 27 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1508 (1973).
71. That standard demanding representation in some manner of most, but not
necessarily all, of the following programming areas: local self expression, develop-
ment of local talent, children's programming, religious programming, educational
programming, public affairs programming, editorialization by licensees, political
broadcasts, agricultural programming, news, weather and markets, sports, minority
programming and (ironically, last in order, but first in the hearts of broadcasters)
entertainment. Network Programming Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960).
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is reluctant to examine programming content under the microscope, be-
lieving "that attempted detailed comparison of individual programs would
necessarily have the ultimate effect of substituting the Commission's ad-
ministrative for management's operating judgment. '7 2
Aside from its concern over relatively simple matters of program con-
tent, the Commission's involvement in questions of "equal time" and the
"fairness doctrine" has carried it into areas of great public concern. In
requiring that licensees provide candidates for elective office with equal
opportunities to purchase time 73 and mandating that issues charged with
public importance be given balanced treatment, the Commission has,
knowingly or otherwise, created considerable impact on a licensee's
programming choices. The fact that Commission regulation has had
such an effect on broadcast speech must necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that broadcasting must occupy a unique first amendment position.
Fairness
It is "idle to point an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broad-
cast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or pub-
lish,"' 74 no doubt due to the physical peculiarities attendant to the broad-
cast phenomenon. 75 Different media of expression are accorded dif-
ferent first amendment treatment, and the traditional distinctions are
well known. 70 In the case of broadcasting, at least three reasons for
72. In re Mike M. Vukelich, 22 F.C.C. 891, 914 (1957). It is helpful to point
out that the Commission has managed to suspend this reluctance-with specific
reference to songs-at least once. Tampa Times Co., 19 F.C.C. 257, 10 P & F
RADio REG. (1955).
73. 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(b) (Supp. 1973). Contrary to the popular miscon-
ception, the so-called "equal time" provision does no more than assure a political
competitor the opportunity to purchase time at the lowest comparable per-unit
charge for the same class and amount of time as was purchased by any other
competitor. The provision is by no means a "give-away." See Wick, The Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 and Political Broadcast Reform, 22 DEPAuL L.
REV. 582 (1973). For an interesting treatment of the equal time provision and
the issue of censorship, see Farmer's Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
74. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94, 136 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
75. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27(1943); Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
aff'd 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
76. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 563 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-88 (1949) (sound trucks); Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (motion pictures); Columbia
Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973)(radio and television).
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distinct first amendment treatment have been suggested:7
(1) Impact. Great reliance in terms of decision-making and news-
event exposure is placed on broadcast media. The great role that these
media play in the lives of their audience, therefore, justifies more careful
regulation.
78
(2) Privilege. A second rationale is rooted in the observation that
broadcast licenses are granted as a matter of privilege, not conferred as
a matter of right. 79
(3) Scarcity. The third rationale, the basis for much of the reason-
ing behind such concepts as the fairness doctrine, exists because the
natural resource of the eleotromagnetic spectrum can only accommodate
a limited number of broadcasters."0
It was the fact that the broadcast spectrum was limited that urged the
first regulation of radio.8 ' Recognizing that access to the airwaves
would be limited by the laws of physics, the Supreme Court itself rec-
ognized that each licensee has a duty to present an outlet for local views, 82
as a logical extension of the licensees' fairness duties.
77. Comment, The First Amendment and Regulation of Television News, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 746, 763 (1972).
78. Id. at 766. While it is admitted that the impact theory smacks a good
deal of the "this is bad for you--don't listen-and you, shut up" school of pater-
nalistic prior restraint, it is not impossible to conceive of facts where imposed
silence, for example, might not be improper. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
79. The right-privilege distinction has generated much commentary for a rela-
tionship that appears to be so simple. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Com-
ceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) and 26 YALE
L.J. 710 (1917). As Hohfeld envisioned it, a power (privilege) was exercised
in relation to some manner of liability, which exposed one who exercised the
power to either pleasant or unpleasant consequences. There is no question that
the broadcaster's day-to-day activities fit under this description, more than they do
under the concept of the "right," which has as its jural correlative the duty-that
is, the performance by someone else of some affirmative act directly related to the
protected right. The only right that the broadcaster would seem to have in this
context is the right to first amendment protection when his acti vities warrant such
protection by the courts. For a more detailed discussion of Hohfeld's "eight funda-
mental legal conceptions," see H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS; BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 141-55 (tent. ed. 1958).
80. See Barrow & Manelli, Communications Technology-A Forecast of Change,
Part 1, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 205 (1969); Johnson, Towers of Babel:
The Chaos in Radio Spectrum Allocation, 34 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 505 (1969);
Levin, The Radio Spectrum Resource, 11 J. LAw & ECON. 433 (1968). The advent
of CATV promises to expand the number of channels to the point where the scarcity
rationale will lose its vitality.
81. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943).
82. "There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Govern-
ment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
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The fairness doctrine is a two-fold concept with a turbulent history.
The first prong of the requirement, that licensees provide balanced dis-
cussion of controversial issues, is one of long standing and has been sub-
ject to repeated Commission consideration. 83 The fairness doctrine makes
no specific demands upon licensees other than to require them to present
balanced coverage.8 4 The only specific kinds of programming require-
ments occur as incident to a particular topic of public importance. For
example, declaration of smoking as an issue of public importance re-
quired that licensees provide time for anti-smoking messages. The re-
quirement is no more specific than that.851 Identifying an issue of public
importance, though, is not so simple. For example, once the ban on
broadcast cigarette advertising became effective, the question of cigarette
smoking ceased to be controversial. 8
The second prong requires licensees actively to seek out and present
controversial issues in a fair manner.8 7 Apparently this affirmative re-
quirement-which here merges with the balance requirement-fades
for certain issues, such as the Viet-Nam War. The Supreme Court has
held that a licensee is under no compulsion to accept paid advertisements
directed against American involvement in Southeast Asia.8 8
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices
which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity,
be barred from the airwaves." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
389 (1969).
83. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
84. At one time, overall balance was the requirement:
[The Fairness] responsibility usually is of the generic kind and thus, in
the absence of unusual circumstances, is not exercised with regard to par-
ticular situations but rather in terms of operating policies of stations as
viewed over a reasonable period of time. This, in the past, has meant re-
view of filed complaints, in connection with the applications made each
three year period for renewal of station licenses.
Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7294 (1960). More recently,
the standard has been applied on an issue-by-issue basis. See Goldberg, A Proposal
to Deregulate Broadcast Programming, 42 GEo. WASH. L REV. 73, 88 (1973).
Most recently, proposed legislation would slide back toward the overall balance
standard. See H.R. 3854, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
85. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 842 (1969).
86. See Larus & Brother Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971).
87. Rollins Broadcasting, Inc., 34 F.C.C. 1, 81-82 (1963).
88. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
The so-called commercial speech doctrine is a body of case law which permits
regulation of advertising. The leading case under this doctrine is Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), which held that the traditional first amendment




Once the traditional regulatory context is understood, and more spe-
cifically, once the extent to which the Commission can impinge upon
first amendment rights is understood, a consideration of music's first
amendment role takes on more meaning. If music is not protectible,
then the discussion of -the propriety of the Commission's Notices can end
here. Otherwise, the Commission would have to show, as Chief Judge
Bazelon suggested 9 that the regulation of drug lyrics bears some rea-
sonable relationship to the eradication of the specific evil-drug abuse.
Characterizing music as expression capable of first amendment pro-
tection is a task of deceptively great difficulty. While the lyric portion
of a song is clearly speech within any conception of the word, some
have argued that the combination of lyric and music together constitute
something largely different from either component standing alone and,
therefore, not susceptible of first amendment protection. These argu-
ments, however, do not represent the exclusive view of aesthetiticians. 90
Discussing music in its generic form for the present, 91 the greatest prob-
lems are encountered in conceiving of music as expression. It is sub-
mitted that since music serves a considerable social function and at the
same time represents an important mode of artistic expression-added
to the fact that lyrics, to the extent that they can be communicated in a
broadcast context, deserve traditional first amendment protection-it
should be characterized as protectible under the first amendment.
As a traditional art form, music provides-as all art does-a social
ordering function:
[A]rt orders social experience through creating forms which all, artist and
public alike, use to communicate so that they can act together.
92
Artistic expression provides a context for the confrontation of ideas;
conflict engenders dialogue; dialogue results in communication; commun-
ication leads to understanding.9
3
commercial advertising. Under this doctrine, Commission interference with broad-
cast advertising would not necessarily be improper. See Note, Commercial Speech
-An End in Sight to Chrestensen?, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1258 (1974).
89. 478 F.2d at 605.
90. See Comment, Drug Songs and the Federal Communications Commission,
5 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 334, 342 (1972). This point is more fully developed
later in this Comment.
91. It is conceded that "music" subsumes within it more than lyrics alone
and music alone. The combination is more than either component alone; certainly
not less.
92. H. DUNCAN, COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL ORDER 6 (1962) (emphasis in
original).
93. The process can be described as part of the "drama of social hierarchy.
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The function of music in society is, therefore, of great importance,
but the question remains as to whether its acknowledged importance
lifts it into the glow of first amendment protection.
The traditional ambit of first amendment protection is familiar. Pro-
tection extends to books,94 public speeches,95 solicitation,"6 labor organ-
izing activities, 9T broadcasting,98 films, 99 use of sound trucks, 100 picket-
ing,101 parades and demonstrations, 10 2 symbolic protests, 10 3 and litiga-
tion.' 0 4  Each incorporates some element of communication, or repre-
sents some activity, both of which are protected, and both of which
somehow represent "speech" of one form or another.
But what is speech? Does it merely require the transfer of meaning
,through the use of symbols? Or does it require something more-some
level of information-before it can be called "speech"? One commenta-
tor is willing to make a threshold observation that would support charac-
terizing music as "speech":
Speech, in the limited oral sense, is a species of communication. The
other processes . . .- writing, miming, filming-are other species. Com-
munication, in a broad sense, is the transfer of messages. By messages
I mean any patterned output no matter how primitive the patterning, from
simple exclamatory directions to highly complex ideational structures. 105
It is difficult to imagine a mode of communication that is more elegantly
patterned and ordered than music.' 0 6
..." Id. at 10. In addition, the artistic experience has importance in its predic-
tive value. Frequently, new notions are first explored in an artistic context. See
also J. DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 345-49 (1934).
94. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1933), afl'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
95. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
96. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
97. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968). But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
98. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
99. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
100. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
101. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284
(1957).
102. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
103. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1965).
104. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
105. Kaufman, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.
U.L. REV. 761, 763-64 (1970) (emphasis added).
106. See generally D. COOKE, THE LANGUAGE OF Music 34 (1959); W. NEW-
MAN, UNDERSTANDING MUSIC (2d ed. 1961); A. SCHOENBERG, STYLE AND IDEA
(1950).
MUSICAL EXPRESSION
Analysis of songs suggests a bifurcated approach-words and music
must be analyzed, as a whole, or individually. If words and music
merge-as it is suggested -they do-with the words taking on secondary
importance and being obscured by the tones of music, it is grandly in-
consistent to be concerned about suppressing verbal messages that, in
essence, do not exist. At the same time, if the words survive their mar-
riage with music, they then have an existence of their own-as words-
and can no more be suppressed than a poem or short story. 1 7
Aestheticians that rebel against acceptance of an efficient fusion of
music and language' 08 encounter their primary difficulty in assessing the
ability of a listener to synthesize both musical and verbal expression
simultaneously. They, therefore, think that understanding and apprecia-
tion of one mode must necessarily vary in inverse proportion to the at-
tention paid to the other. This observation ignores the opportunity for
repeated listening and consequent complementary understanding.
Hence, it is possible to hear a selection twice-once for words, and
once for music. While aesthetic appreciation of the whole may suffer,
understanding of the parts-specifically the verbal part-may be en-
hanced.
While verbal expression has the acknowledged capacity to communi-
cate and, where appropriate, is accorded first amendment protection,
according the same protection to pure music would seem to encounter
some difficulty, but none that is insurmountable. A work of pure music
can express and-more importantly-convey feeling and emotion. Be-
ginning with the conception in the mind of the composer, 109 the idea can
be expressed as rhythm, melody, harmony and all of the other intricate
devices of musical expression."10  Indeed, it has been suggested that
107. The concern about paying attention to the words is a matter of importance
if only because understandable words would seem to be essential in order for a
song to glorify or promote drug use. At least one commentator has perceived a
song's ability to advocate an idea as varying in inverse proportion to its artistic
merit.
Songs used in commercials on radio and television are typical. But they
succeed only when their artistic merit is slight. When they achieve a
moderate amount of artistic merit, then they cease to advocate anything
at all, because they take on aesthetic, rather than semantic characteristics,
and people begin to respond to them aesthetically, rather than semanti-
cally.
Comment, Drug Songs and the Federal Communications Commission, 5 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 334, 342 n.56 (1972).
108. See, e.g., M. BEARDSLEY, AnsmErIcs, § 19, at 350 (1958).
109. This phenomenon may be rooted in (1) a literary text-a mass, anthem,
etc.; (2) a literary idea--operas, oratorios; (3) an ideal; or (4) an impulse. D.
CooKE, THE LANGUAGE OF MUSIC 168 (1959).
110. The views of Edward Hanslick, who refused to accept the notion that any
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just as words serve as symbols for concepts"' music also serves to con-
vey meaning and concepts that cannot be borne by words. 112
All the arts, after their fashion, serve the purpose of communication-es-
sentially, the purpose of language. All, indeed, strive for and often reach
the vividness of metaphor, the most vivid of linguistic devices for com-
munication. Music, originating in the region of consciousness where the
meaning of experience is felt, has an almost unique aptness for metaphoric
utterance. 113
To say that any expression that lacks words cannot be protected merely
because a handful of examples of it feature a clearly separable conduct
component" 4 is to commit the sin of over-inclusion. The example of
nonverbal conduct-the punch-in-the-nose, with its connotations, or even
clear denotations of personal dislike is not equivalent to the Sinfonia An-
tartica merely because each achieves some level of expression in a non-
verbal manner. While the former example may be rather casually ex-
cluded from first amendment protection, the latter is not so easily dis-
missed, if for no other reason, that it contains something-albeit diffi-
cult to quantify-worthy of protection. That a punch-in-the-nose may
be delivered in a characteristic, attractive or even praiseworthy manner
is undeniable. Nevertheless, its mission is singular and less artistic than
the symphony. It is this quantum of artistic expression-something
different from "symbolic speech"-that merits protection." 5  In addi-
tion, if music-in either the fused or the singular sense-has the capacity
to advocate ideas in any way, the first amendment protects it.116
If songs and their constituent parts, lyrics and music, are protectible,
then any regulation of what the broadcaster chooses to broadcast must
not offend first amendment restrictions, 1 7 specifically the "clear and pres-
non-verbal expression could have meaning, have been criticized since their first publi-
cation in 1854. See G. EPPERSON, THE MUSICAL SYMBOL 107 (1967).
111. E. SAPIR, LANGUAGE DEFINED, INTRODUCTORY READINGS ON LANGUAGE
1, 9 (W. Anderson & N. Stageberg, eds. 1966).
112. D. FERGUSON, MUSIC AS METAPHOR 181 (1960).
113. Id. at 187.
114. See, e.g., Comment, Drug Songs and the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 334, 345 n.71 (1972).
115. That information transfer is required for expression to be protected is by
no means clear. How may one characterize Ulysses? Is it a religious tract, a
political work, a literary exercise? May an analogy to motion pictures, therefore,
be suggested? See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166
(1948).
116. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684, 688 (1959).




ent danger" test."18 The standard demands a highly compelling logical
relationship---that the evil will be removed by the suppression of the
speech must necessarily follow.119 Nevertheless, those linking drug-lyrics
with drug use express strong doubt as to the strength of the causal chain. 120
The connection is conjectural. Without more compelling evidence that
promotion or glorification of drug use in song lyrics results in more drug
use, the Commission's urgings-with the effect of rules-lack the logical
force needed to be constitutionally permissible.
CONCLUSION
The drug problem nevertheless does persist. Its solution is certainly
beyond the scope of this comment, but two observations are in order.
First, drug abuse can be more fruitfully attacked by regulating those
activities that are more directly related to it. There is no question that
licensees must operate in. the public interest. Likewise, there is no
question that advocacy of illegal drug usage (or perhaps even legal drug
usage that may be just as harmful) does not comport with this duty.
But it is quite another matter to go so far as to suppress a medium of
artistic expression to eradicate the evil. Broadcasters could sooner sup-
press automobile advertisements that glorify high-performance and high-
speed driving in order to preserve lives on the highway.'12
118. See Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck
to Brandenburg-And Beyond, 1969 Sup. Cr. REv. 41.
119. The case of Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) involved distribution
of Communist-oriented handbills. The standard upon which the criminal defendant
was convicted was thus: Forcible action must have been contemplated but it would
be sufficient to sustain a conviction if the accused intended that an insurrection
"should happen at any time within which he might reasonably expect his influence
to continue to be directly operative in causing such action by those whom he sought
to induce." Id. at 254-55. Not surprisingly, this standard was held to be too vague.
Read another way, the standard might convict someone where the probability of con-
necting prohibited activity with a precedent exhortation was low. The standard
lacked formal predictive precision. It is this manner of regulation that the first
amendment will not allow.
120. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 606 n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1973):
The only evidence in the record on this point [whether the songs at issue
had a demonstrable connection with illegal activities] is the statement of
the Director of The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs expressing
strong doubt that there is any connection between "drug-oriented song lyr-
ics" and the use of drugs. The New York Times, March 28, 1971, p.41,
c. 1.
121. Broadcasters could probably do so with less constitutional difficulty than
they could suppress drug lyrics. See Note, Freedom of Speech in a Commercial
Context, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1191 (1965); Maher, Purity versus Plugola: A Study
of the Federal Communications Commission's Sponsorship Identification Rules,
23 DEPAUL L. REV, 903 (1974).
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Second, the more desirable alternative to suppression is to rely on af-
firmative licensee action. Most licensees have responded to the problem
in a manner that surely comports with the public interest standard.
They have aired spot announcements and other program material seeking
to remedy drug abuse.
To say that the Federal Communications Commission frequently over-
reacts is something of an understatement. It is, some would say thank-
fully, a unique regulatory agency, at once capable of highly sophisticated
reasoning and at the same time capable of petty exercises in confusion.
No more complex observation need be made other than to say that the
law of broadcasting involves interesting-frequently vital-issues of first
amendment expression. The Federal Communications Commission's ac-
tivities in this area are at times inconsistent and surprising, but rarely dull.
Samuel Fifer*
* Mr. Fifer, a member of the Illinois Bar, was Managing Editor of the DePaul
Law Review, 1973-74.
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